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Abstract. We consider the fair division of indivisible items using the
maximin shares measure. Recent work on the topic has focused on ex-
tending results beyond the class of additive valuation functions. In this
spirit, we study the case where the items form an hereditary set sys-
tem. We present a simple algorithm that allocates each agent a bundle
of items whose value is at least 0.3667 times the maximin share of the
agent. This improves upon the current best known guarantee of 0.2 due
to Ghodsi et al. The analysis of the algorithm is almost tight; we present
an instance where the algorithm provides a guarantee of at most 0.3738.
We also show that the algorithm can be implemented in polynomial time
given a valuation oracle for each agent.
1 Introduction
Consider the problem of dividing up m heterogenous goods amongst n agents.
How can this be achieved in an equitable manner? This is the classical problem
of fair division in economics and political science [14]. The issue that arises
immediately is how to define “fairness”. Two important concepts that have been
widely studied are proportionality and envy-freeness. An allocation of the items
to the agents is proportional if, for every agent, the value that the agent has for
the grand bundle (all of the items) is at most a factor n times greater than the
value it has for the bundle it receives. The allocation is envy-free if the value an
agent has for the bundle it receives is at least as great as the value it has for the
bundle of any other agent; that is, no agent is willing to exchange its allocated
bundle for the bundle of another agent.3
Fair division has been extensively studied in the case of divisible items, typ-
ically in the general guise of cake-cutting [5,13]. Interestingly, for divisible items
general equilibria can provide fair allocations in restricted settings. For example,
assume the agents have linear valuation functions. If each agent is now given the
same budget then equilibrium prices exist where all items are completely sold
and each agent receives a most desired bundle; this concept of competitive equi-
librium from equal incomes is due to Varian [15].
?? The first author thanks McGill University for hosting them while conducting this
research.
3 Observe that if the agents have sub-additive valuation functions then envy-freeness
implies proportionality.
ar
X
iv
:1
81
2.
09
56
1v
1 
 [c
s.D
M
]  
22
 D
ec
 20
18
In practice, however, the fair division of indivisible items is more important
than that of divisible items. This can be seen from the plethora of real-world
examples, including course registration in universities, shift scheduling, draft
assignment in sport, client assignment to sales-people, airport slot assignments,
divorce settlements, and estate division [6,10]. But, at first glance, it is not
clear anything useful can be said regarding the fair division of indivisible goods.
For instance, what is a fair way to allocate a single indivisible good between two
agents? An important concept used in understanding the case of indivisible goods
was introduced by Budish [6], namely, maximin shares. The basic protocol is
familiar to every child when cake cutting: “I cut, you choose”. More generally, for
n agents and m indivisible goods, one agent partitions the items into n bundles
but that agent then gets the last choice of bundle. Intuitively, a risk averse
agent seeks a partition that maximizes the value of its least desired bundle in
the partition. The minimum value of a bundle in the optimal partition value is
called the maximin share for the agent. Clearly, since the agents have different
valuation functions, the optimal partitions and the corresponding maximin share
values may differ for each agent. The first question that then arises is whether
one can partition the items in such a way that every agent receives a bundle
whose value is at least its maximin share. The answer is no, even for additive
valuation functions [10]. This negative result leads to the question of whether
or not approximate solutions exist. Specifically, is there a partition that gives
every agent a bundle with value at least an α-fraction of their maximin share?
In groundbreaking work, for additive valuation functions, Kurokawa, Procaccia
and Wang [10] showed the existence of a partition with α = 23 ; polynomial
time algorithms with the same guarantee were subsequently given in [1] and
[2]. A stronger guarantee of α = 34 was very recently obtained by Ghodsi et al.
[8]. More general classes of valuation function have also been studied. Barman
and Krishnamurthy [2] proved a bound of α = 110 for the class of submodular
valuation functions. This was improved to 13 by Ghodsi et al. [8], who also proved
guarantees of 15 for fractionally subadditive (XOS) valuations and Ω(1/ log n) for
subadditive valuations.
1.1 Our Results.
In this paper, we consider the fair division problem in an hereditary set system
(or downward-closed set system). A set system H = (J,F) consists of a collection
J of items and a family F of feasible (independent) subsets of J . The set system
satisfies the hereditary property if:
S ∈ F and T ⊂ S =⇒ T ∈ F
Hereditary set systems are ubiquitous in computer science and optimization.
They arise naturally in the presence of packing or cost constraints, for example
in scheduling problems and manufacturing processes. Furthermore, they are of
fundamental theoretic importance; notable combinatorial and geometric objects
that satisfy the hereditary property include matroids, simplicial complexes, and
minor closed graph families such as networks embeddable on a surface.
In an hereditary set system, each agent i has a value vi,j for each item j
but these values are additive only on feasible sets in the set system. A formal
description of this model is given in Section 2 along with a proposed algorithm for
dividing up the items amongst the agents. Our main result, given in Section 3, is
that this algorithm provides a guarantee of at least 0.3667 for the maximin shares
problem in a hereditary set system. This improves on the current best known
bound of 0.2. In Section 4 we prove that our bound is almost tight by constructing
an instance where the algorithm has a performance guarantee of at most 0.3738.
Consequently, our lower and upper bounds for the performance guarantee of
the algorithm are within an amount 0.007. The basic implementation of the
algorithm runs in exponential time. So in Section 5 we show how to implement
the procedure in polynomial time. Specifically, given a valuation oracle for each
agent, the algorithm makes at most a polynomial in m number of queries to the
oracles and performs a polynomial amount of computation given the responses
of the oracles.
2 The Hereditary Maximin Share Problem
In this section, we describe the maximin share problem on an hereditary set
system. We present a fair division algorithm for the problem and provide a
simple performance analysis of the procedure (which we improve upon in the
next section).
2.1 The Fair-Division Model.
We have a set I of n agents and collection J of m items. The items belong to an
hereditary set system H = (J,F) and agents desire feasible (independent) sets
in the set system. Specifically, each agent i has an additive valuation function
over independent sets. That is, for any S ∈ F we have vi(S) =
∑
j∈S vi,j . The
value the agent has for a set S /∈ F is simply the maximum value it has for any
feasible subset of S; that is vi(S) = max
T∈F :T⊂S
∑
j∈T vi,j .
Our aim is to fairly divide up the items amongst the agents. We measure the
fairness of a division with respect to the maximin share of each agent. To define
this, let P be the set of all partitions of the items into n sets. The value of the
maximin share for a agent i is then
MMS(i) = max
P∈P
min
P∈P
vi(P ).
That is, the maximin share is a partition that maximizes the value of the least
valuable bundle in the partition. A partition Pi = {P 1i , P 2i , . . . , Pni } ∈ P that
attains this value is called a maximin partition for agent i and the elements of Pi
are called maximin parts. Observe that the maximin partition may be different
for each agent.
Our objective is to find a partition of the items {S1, S2, . . . , S`} where the
bundle Si allocated to agent i has value at least its maximin share. In general
this is not possible, so instead we search for approximate solutions. Specifically,
we desire the maximum fraction α > 0 and an allocation {S1, S2, . . . , S`} such
that vi(Si) ≥ α · MMS(i), for every agent i. We call this the hereditary maximin
share problem.
The hereditary maximin share problem has a constant factor approximation.
This is because our valuation functions are fractionally subadditive (XOS). That
is, the valuation function can be defined as the maximum over a collection of
additive set functions. To show this, for each agent i, we define an additive
function aSi over the items for each independent set S ∈ F . Specifically, let
aSi (j) =
{
vi,j if j ∈ S
0 if j /∈ S .
It is then easy to verify, for any set T (independent or not), that
vi(T ) = max
S∈F
∑
j∈T
aSi (j).
Thus vi is indeed fractionally subadditive. Using this fact, it follows from recent
work of Ghodsi et al. [8] that a performance guarantee of 0.2 is obtainable.
Theorem 1. [8] There is an algorithm for the fair division problem in hereditary
set systems that allocates every agent a bundle with an approximation guarantee
α = 15 . uunionsq
We remark that the valuation functions for hereditary set systems are not
submodular functions.4 The aim of this paper is to improve upon the α = 0.2
performance guarantee.
2.2 A Fair-Division Algorithm.
To obtain a better performance guarantee we apply a simple and natural pro-
cedure. To begin, without loss of generality, we may assume that the maximin
share of every agent is exactly 1 by normalizing. Even stronger, we may assume
that, for every agent i, there exists a maximin partition such that the agent has
value exactly 1 for each part in the partition. To see this formally, let Pi be a
maximin partition for agent i. Now define a new valuation function vˆi with the
property that vˆi,j =
vi,j
vi(P )
if item j is in part P ∈ Pi. Thus vˆi(P ) = 1, for each
part P ∈ Pi. It is then easy to verify that an allocation that provides a value α
with respect to vˆi is a factor α allocation with respect to the true valuation vi.
4 For example, consider an hereditary set system H = (J,F) with three items J =
{a, b, c} and let the maximal independent sets in F be {a} and {b, c}. Suppose
agent i has item values vi,a = 3, vi,b = 2 and vi,c = 2. Thus vi({a, c}) = 3 and
vi({a, b, c}) = 4. Consequently, the marginal value of adding item c to the set {a, b}
is larger than the marginal value of adding item c to the set {a}. Thus the valuation
function is not submodular.
We are now ready to present our fair-division algorithm which begins with
the normalization above. This normalization is not required in our polynomial
time algorithm; see Section 5. Given a target value α, we search for a minimum
cardinality feasible sets of at least the targeted value for some agent. If such a
set is found we allocate that set (bundle) to that agent and then recurse on the
remaining items and agents. This method is formalized in Procedure 1.
Procedure 1 The Fair Division Algorithm
Input: A set I of agents, a set J of items, and a target value α.
for τ = 1 to m do
while there exists a set S ⊆ J with |S| = τ and an i ∈ I with vi(S) ≥ α do
Allocate bundle S to agent i
Set I ← I \ {i}
Set J ← J \ S
We use the following notation. Let {S1, S2, . . . , S`} be the bundles assigned
by the procedure in order; note that ` ≤ n. We view the procedure as working
in phases. In Phase τ the procedure searches for bundles of cardinality τ that
provide utility at least α for some agent; note that τ ≤ m. We denote by Aτ the
collection of all items allocated during Phase τ .
2.3 A Simple Analysis.
To begin, let’s present a very simple analysis that shows this algorithm gives a
factor α = 13 guarantee. In Section 4, we will give a more intricate and nearly
tight analysis.
Theorem 2. The procedure allocates every agent a bundle of value at least α =
1
3 .
Proof. Clearly, if an agent is allocated a bundle by the procedure then it receives
a bundle of value at least α. So it suffices to show that the procedure allocates
every agent a bundle if it is run with a target value α = 13 . For a contradiction,
suppose the procedure terminates after allocating bundles to ` < n agents. Let
i be an agent that is not allocated a bundle.
We may assume that A1 = ∅. That is, vi,j < α for every agent i and every
item j and so no items are allocated in Phase 1. The argument is standard [10]:
if a set of cardinality one is allocated to an agent then this item intersects at
most one of the n bundles in the maximin partition of any other agent. Thus
n−1 of the bundles in the partition are untouched and each still have total value
1. Consequently, n−1 agents remain and they each have a partition of the items
into n− 1 bundles each with value 1. Thus, we recurse on this smaller problem.
Therefore, we may assume the procedure only allocates items in Phases τ ≥ 2.
Since the algorithm considers items in increasing size τ , agents receive a minimal
bundle with value the sum of value of its elements (by definition of valuation).
Now take any set S allocated to some agent k in Phase τ . It must be the case
that vi(S) <
τ
τ−1 ·α. If not then there is a set T ⊂ S with cardinality τ − 1 such
that vi(T ) ≥ τ−1τ · ττ−1 ·α = α. But, by the hereditary property, the bundle T is
an independent set so should then have been allocated to agent i in Phase τ −1.
Let bundle Sk be the kth bundle allocated, where 1 ≤ k ≤ `. Let U be the set of
items unallocated by the procedure. Then the total value of unallocated items
in some bundle of the maximin partition Pi of agent i is at least
∑
j∈U∩Pi
vi(j) ≥ n−
∑`
k=1
vi(Sk) ≥ n−
∑`
k=1
|Sk|
|Sk| − 1 · α ≥ n−
∑`
k=1
2 · α (1)
Here the final inequality arises as A1 = ∅ and so |Sk| ≥ 2 for every allocated
bundle. Since α = 13 , we obtain from (1) that∑
j∈U∩Pi
vi(j) ≥ n− 2
3
` > n− 2
3
n =
n
3
Because the maximin partition Pi contains exactly n parts, there is a part that
contains a set S of unallocated items where vi(S) ≥ n3 · 1n = 13 . By the heredi-
tary property, this contradicts the fact that the procedure terminated without
allocating agent i a bundle. Thus every agent received a bundle of value at least
1
3 . uunionsq
3 An Improved Lower Bound
In this section, we provide a much more detailed analysis of the fair division
algorithm and prove it provides for an approximation guarantee of α = 0.3667.
This analysis is almost tight; in Section 4 we present an example showing that
the performance of the procedure is not better than α = 0.3738.
Theorem 3. The procedure allocates every agent a bundle of value at least α =
11
30 .
Before proving this theorem, let’s give some intuition behind the analysis. The
basic approach is the same as in Theorem 2. For an appropriately chosen target
value α we run the procedure and assume for a contradiction that some agent
i was not allocated a bundle. We then consider the maximin shares partition
P = {P1, P2, . . . , Pn} for agent i and show that some part P ∈ P contains items
with total value at least α that are unallocated at the end of the procedure. By
the hereditary property, this will contradict the fact the procedure terminated
without allocating a bundle to agent i.
However, in order for this method to work for α = 1130 , we refine the analysis in
four key ways. First, upon termination of the procedure, rather than considering
the entire maximin shares partition P = {P1, P2, . . . , Pn} for agent i, we focus
on a restricted sub-partition Pˆ of P. To find Pˆ we use combinatorial arguments
on an auxiliary graph that is constructed with respect to the allocation decisions
made in Phase 2 of the procedure. With this sub-partition Pˆ more specialized
accounting techniques can then be applied. We explain how to find the sub-
partition Pˆ in Section 3.1.
For the second improvement, note that upon termination we now wish to
show that at least one of the parts P ∈ Pˆ has unallocated items with total value
α. For this to not hold at the end of the procedure, we require that each part
contains unallocated items of total value less than α. This simple observation is
useful in that once a part contains unallocated items of value less than α, the
removal of additional items from that part does not hurt us any more. In fact,
the removal of additional items from such a part is actually beneficial to us in
the analysis as such items do not reduce the value of parts that may still feasibly
provide agent i with a bundle of value α. To quantify this, let
vP = 1−
∑
τ≥1
∑
j∈P∩Aτ
vi,j
be the total value of unallocated items in part P ∈ Pˆ upon termination of
the algorithm. We then denote by sP = α − vP the superfluity of part P . We
may assume that sP > 0, otherwise the procedure would have allocated agent i a
bundle. Accounting for this superfluous damage will be the second key ingredient
in the proof.
The third idea is to exploit any laxity the procedure provides before the start
of the third phase. Essentially the laxity lP of a part P ∈ Pˆ is a measure of how
much better the unallocated value of the part is after Phase 2 than a “perceived”
worst case. The fourth key idea is to amortize our accounting process. Rather
than simply focus independently on items in each part of the partition Pˆ, we
will also redistribute values within allocated bundles that cross multiple parts in
the partition. The concepts of superfluity and laxity are explained in Section 3.2
along with a description of the amortization process. The proof of Theorem 3 is
then given in Section 3.3.
3.1 Finding a Sub-Partition.
Now assume the procedure terminates after ` < n iterations leaving at least one
agent i who does not receive a bundle. Let the maximin partition for agent i be
P = {P1, P2, . . . , Pn}. Let J∗ ⊆ J be the set of items allocated to agents during
the procedure. We will show
max
1≤k≤n
vi(Pk \ J∗) ≥ α (2)
This will contradict the fact that the procedure terminated without allocating
a bundle to agent i. So let’s prove that inequality (2) holds. As in the proof of
Theorem 2, without loss of generality, we may assume no items were allocated in
Phase 1; that is, A1 = ∅. Next we construct an auxiliary graph G based upon the
allocation decisions made in Phase 2. The graph contains n vertices, one vertex
for each part Pk in the partition P. The graph contains an edge connecting the
two (possibly equal) parts containing the two items of the bundle, for each bundle
allocated in Phase 2. Observe that a vertex in G may have degree greater than
one since the part it represents may contain multiple items. This also implies
that G may contain edges that are self-loops; this happens whenever a bundle
allocated in Phase 2 consists of two items in the same part of the partition P.
Let’s further investigate the structure of G. Let X be a maximal set of vertices
of G that induce at least |X| edges. Note that such a set exists because ∅ is a
feasible choice for X. On the other hand, it must be the case that X 6= V (G).
This follows as G contains exactly n vertices but ` < n edges. But this, in turn,
implies that X induces exactly |X| edges. If X induced more than |X| edges
then we could add to it any other vertex in V (G) \ X and still maintain the
desired property.
Now consider the subgraph G \X. This subgraph is a forest F . If it contained
a cycle C then X ∪ V (C) would contradict the maximality of X. Furthermore,
there are no edges between X and G \ X; otherwise, the endpoint in G \ X of
such an edge could have been added to X.
Let the forest F contain s components consisting of a single vertex – observe
that, by the above argument, these vertices are also singleton components of G.
Let F contain c non-trivial components, that is, trees with at least one edge.
Clearly, every non-trivial tree contains at least two leaves. Therefore, we may
select a set Y that consists of every vertex in non-trivial trees in F except for
exactly two leaves in each non-trivial tree. Finally, we set Z = V (G) \ (X ∪ Y ).
An illustration of the auxiliary graph G and the sets X,Y and Z is shown in
Figure 1.
X Y
single
vertex
component
leaf 1 leaf 2
leaf 1
leaf 2
maximin part
(=vertex)item
size 2 bundle
(= edge)
non-trivial
componentnon-trivial
component
Z
Fig. 1. The Auxiliary Graph.
The sub-partition Pˆ of P consisting of the vertices in Z = V (G) \ (X ∪ Y )
will be important to us. Let’s now present a couple of combinatorial equalities
that will be useful later. The first is a claim that follows trivially by definition
of Pˆ. The second is a lemma quantifying how many agents are allocated bundles
in Phase 2.
Claim. The number of parts in the sub-partition Pˆ is |Z| = 2c+ s. uunionsq
Lemma 1. The number of agents allocated a bundle in Phase 2 is exactly |X|+
|Y |+ c.
Proof. Observe that, by construction, the number of agents allocated a bundle in
Phase 2 is exactly |E(G)|. So we must count the number of edges in the auxiliary
graph G. We have seen that E(G) = E(X)∪E(F ). By the maximality of X, we
have that |E(X)| = |X|. In addition, |V (F )| = |Y |+ 2c+ s. Thus, as F consists
of exactly c + s trees, |E(F )| = (|Y |+ 2c+ s) − (c + s) = |Y | + c. Putting this
together gives |E(G)| = |X|+ |Y |+ c, as desired. uunionsq
We will focus our counting arguments on the sub-partition Pˆ in order to ob-
tain a contradiction to the fact that agent i was not allocated a bundle. Specif-
ically, we will show that at least one of the vertices in Z contains unallocated
items that together provide value at least α to agent i.
3.2 Laxity, Superfluity and Amortization.
Consider the allocated items in Pˆ. As A1 = ∅, every item j has vi,j < α. We
now study the value (to agent i) of the items in Pˆ allocated in Phase 2. To
do this, recall that the vertices of Pˆ = Z are of two types, vertices of degree 0
in G (specifically, singleton vertices in F ) and vertices of degree 1 (that is, leaf
vertices in F ). Vertices of degree 0 contain no items that are allocated in Phase 2.
Vertices of degree 1 in G contain exactly one item that is allocated in Phase 2.
So given a part P ∈ Pˆ, we define the laxity of P to be lP = α if P corresponds
to a singleton vertex in F . Otherwise, if P corresponds to a leaf vertex in F we
define lP = (1−vi,j∗(P ))− (1−α) = α−vi,j∗(P ), where j∗(P ) is the unique item
of P that is allocated in Phase 2. Observe that lP > 0 since vi,j < α for every
item j and in particular for j∗(P ). We can use the laxity to quantify the total
value of items in Pˆ allocated in Phase 2.
Lemma 2.
∑
P∈Pˆ
∑
j∈P∩A2 vi,j = 2α · c−
∑
P∈Pˆ lP .
Proof. We have∑
P∈Pˆ
∑
j∈P∩A2
vi,j =
∑
P∈Pˆ
(α− lP ) = 2c · α−
∑
P∈Pˆ
lP
Here the first equality holds since when P corresponds to singleton, the associ-
ated term in the sum is 0 = α− α = α− lP , and when P corresponds to a leaf,
the associated term is vi,j∗(P ) = α − lP . The final equality follows as Pˆ = Z
contains exactly 2 · c vertices of degree 1. uunionsq
Next we want to bound the value (to agent i) of items allocated in Phases 3
and beyond. First, let’s count the number of bundles allocated in Phases 3 and
beyond.
Lemma 3. The number of agents allocated a bundle in Phases 3 and beyond is
at most c+ s− 1.
Proof. By Lemma 1, the number of agents allocated a bundle in Phase 2 is
exactly |E(G)| = |X|+ |Y |+c. Consequently, as agent i is not allocated a bundle
in the procedure, the number of agents allocated bundles in Phases 3 and beyond
is at most
(n− 1)− |E(G)| = (n− 1)− (|X|+ |Y |+ c)
= (|X|+ |Y |+ |Pˆ| − 1)− (|X|+ |Y |+ c)
= |Pˆ| − 1− c
= (2c+ s)− 1− c
= c+ s− 1
Here the second equality arises because n = |X| + |Y | + |Z| and |Z| = |Pˆ|; the
fourth equality follows from Claim 3.1. uunionsq
Now let’s bound the value of bundles allocated in Phases 3 and beyond. We
will need two more definitions. First, recall, we defined the superfluity of a part
P as sP = α −
(
1−∑τ≥1 ∑j∈P∩Aτ vi,j). For the purpose of our analysis, we
also define the excess eP of a part P ∈ Pˆ to be the sum of its superfluity and
its laxity. Therefore
eP = sP + lP
=
α− 1 +∑
τ≥1
∑
j∈P∩Aτ
vi,j
+ (α− vi,j∗(P ))
= 2α− 1 +
∑
τ≥3
∑
j∈P∩Aτ
vi,j (3)
The final equality holds because A1 = ∅ and P ∩ A2 is either {j∗(P )} or ∅.
As discussed, to bound the value of bundles allocated in Phases 3 and be-
yond, we will amortize our accounting process. In these phases each allocated
bundle has cardinality at least three. Take such a bundle, say B = {j1, j2, . . . , jk}
allocated to some agent τ . The hereditary property states that B \ {j} is fea-
sible, for every item j ∈ B. Thus, because B is a minimum cardinality feasi-
ble bundle of value at least α when it is allocated, it must be the case that
vi(B \ {j}) < α. Observe, this applies even for the least valuable item jˆ ∈ B to
agent i in the bundle B. Furthermore, because B is an independent set, we have
that (i) vi(B \ {jˆ}) = vi(B) − vi,jˆ , and (ii) vi,jˆ is at most the average value of
an item in B. Putting this all together gives
vi(B) < α+ vi,jˆ ≤ α+
1
k
· vi(B)
As k ≥ 3, we obtain
vi(B) <
k
k − 1 · α ≤
3
2
· α (4)
Hence, each bundle that is allocated in Phase 3 reduces the total value to agent
i of items in Pˆ by at most 32 · α. For bundles of cardinality at least 4 (allocated
in Phases 4 and beyond) this is at most 43 ·α. This bound suffices for bundles of
size at least 4. We now bound bundles allocated in Phase 3 more carefully. To
do so, we amortize the accounting process by defining for any item j allocated
in a bundle B by the mechanism,
aj =
vi(B)
|B| .
That is, aj is the average value of items in B. Since each allocated bundle is
minimal and has cardinality 3, we have, for any item j, that
aj ≤ 1
3
(α+ vi,j) (5)
We now further partition elements of A3 into two sets whose values we will
bound independently in order to reduce the gaps in our accounting. To this end,
let U consist of those items in A3 that belong to a part P ∈ Pˆ which contains
no other elements of A3. That is, j ∈ U if item j is the only item of A3 in some
part P ∈ Pˆ. Let U¯ = A3 \ U ; thus, U¯ consists of those items in A3 that belong
to a part P ∈ Pˆ which contains a least two items of A3.
Claim. If α ≤ 1130 then for any part P of Pˆ∑
j∈P∩U¯
aj − eP ≤ 1
6
· |P ∩ U¯ |.
Proof. Take any part P ∈ Pˆ. If P contains no elements of U¯ then the claim is
trivially true as, by definition, eP ≥ 0. Otherwise, by definition of U¯ , it must be
the case that P contains at least two elements of U¯ . Let j1 be the most valuable
and j2 the second most valuable amongst items in P∩U¯ . Assume j1 was allocated
in the bundle B and j2 was allocated in the bundle B
′, where possibly B = B′.
By the minimality of B, we have vi(B) ≤ α+ vi,j1 . Since j1 ∈ U¯ ⊆ A3, we have
that |B| = 3 and so
aj1 =
vi(B)
|B| ≤
α+ vi,j1
|B| =
α+ vi,j1
3
(6)
By the same argument, aj2 ≤ α+vi,j23 . Hence,
aj1 + aj2 −
1
3
· eP ≤ 1
3
(α+ vi,j1) +
1
3
(α+ vi,j2)−
1
3
eP
=
2α
3
+
1
3
(vi,j1 + vi,j2 − eP )
≤ 2α
3
+
1
3
1− 2α−∑
τ≥3
∑
j∈P\{j1,j2}∩Aτ
vi,j
 (7)
Here, the final inequality follows by (3). Thus we have
aj1 + aj2 −
1
3
· eP ≤ 1
3
− 1
3
·
∑
τ≥3
∑
j∈P\{j1,j2}∩Aτ
vi,j
≤ 1
3
− 1
3
·
∑
j∈P\{j1,j2}∩A3
vi,j
≤ 1
3
− 1
3
·
∑
j∈P\{j1,j2}∩U¯
vi,j (8)
Hence∑
j∈P∩U¯
aj − eP = (aj1 + aj2 −
1
3
· eP ) +
∑
j∈P\{j1,j2}∩U¯
aj − 2
3
· eP
≤
1
3
− 1
3
·
∑
j∈P\{j1,j2}∩U¯
vi,j
+ ∑
j∈P\{j1,j2}∩U¯
aj − 2
3
· eP
≤
1
3
− 1
3
·
∑
j∈P\{j1,j2}∩U¯
vi,j
+ 1
3
·
∑
j∈P\{j1,j2}∩U¯
(α+ vi,j)− 2
3
· eP
The above inequalities follow from (8) and (5), respectively. Consequently,∑
j∈P∩U¯
aj − eP ≤ 1
3
+
1
3
·
∑
j∈P\{j1,j2}∩U¯
α− 2
3
· eP
≤ 1
3
+
1
3
·
∑
j∈P\{j1,j2}∩U¯
α
=
1
6
+
1
6
+
α
3
· (|P ∩ U¯ | − 2)
≤ 1
6
· |P ∩ U¯ | (9)
Here the final inequality follows as α = 1130 ≤ 12 . This completes the proof of the
claim. uunionsq
Applying Claim 3.2 to every part P ∈ Pˆ, we obtain that∑
j∈U¯
aj ≤ 1
6
· |U¯ |+
∑
P∈Pˆ
eP (10)
Moreover, because aj ≤ 12 · α for all j ∈ U ⊆ A3, we also have∑
j∈U
aj ≤ 1
2
· α · |U | (11)
3.3 Proof of the Improved Bound.
We are now ready to prove the stated performance guarantee of the procedure.
Theorem 3. The procedure allocates every agent a bundle of value at least α =
11
30 .
Proof. Let β3 be the number of bundles of size 3 allocated in Phase 3 and let
β4+ be number of bundles of size at least 4 allocated in Phase 4 and beyond.
Applying inequality (4) for k ≥ 4, we have∑
τ≥4
∑
j∈Aτ
vi,j ≤ 4
3
· α · β4+ (12)
This gives ∑
τ≥3
∑
j∈Aτ
vi,j =
∑
j∈A3
vi,j +
∑
τ≥4
∑
j∈Aτ
vi,j
≤
∑
j∈A3
vi,j +
4α
3
· β4+
=
∑
j∈A3
aj +
4α
3
· β4+
=
∑
j∈U
aj +
∑
j∈U¯
aj +
4α
3
· β4+
where the last equality follows by definition of U and U¯ . Applying (11) and (10)
then produces:
∑
τ≥3
∑
j∈Aτ
vi,j ≤ α
2
· |U |+
1
6
· |U¯ |+
∑
P∈Pˆ
eP
+ 4α
3
· β4+
=
α
2
· |U |+ 1
6
· (|A3| − |U |) + 4α
3
· β4+ +
∑
P∈Pˆ
eP
=
(
α
2
− 1
6
)
· |U |+ 1
6
· |A3|+ 4α
3
· β4+ +
∑
P∈Pˆ
eP
≤
(
α
2
− 1
6
)
· |U |+ 1
2
· β3 + 4α
3
· β4+ +
∑
P∈Pˆ
eP
≤
(
α
2
− 1
6
)
· |U |+ 1
2
· (β3 + β4+) +
∑
P∈Pˆ
eP
Here the second inequality is due to the fact that |A3| = 3β3; the final inequality
follows as our target value is α = 1130 ≤ 38 .
Now, by definition, there is at most one element of U for each of the 2c + s
maximin parts in Pˆ. So |U | ≤ 2c + s. Furthermore, by Lemma 3, we have
β3 + β4+ ≤ c+ s− 1. Therefore, it follows that∑
τ≥3
∑
j∈Aτ
vi,j ≤
(
α
2
− 1
6
)
(2c+ s) +
1
2
(c+ s) +
∑
P∈Pˆ
eP (13)
We are now ready to complete the proof. The total value of non-superflous,
allocated items in Pˆ at the end of the procedure is then at most∑
τ≥1
∑
j∈Aτ
vi,j −
∑
P∈Pˆ
sP =
∑
j∈A1
vi,j +
∑
j∈A2
vi,j +
∑
τ≥3
∑
j∈Aτ
vi,j −
∑
P∈Pˆ
sP
= 0 +
2αc−∑
P∈Pˆ
lP
+∑
τ≥3
∑
j∈Aτ
vi,j −
∑
P∈Pˆ
sP
≤ 2αc−
∑
P∈Pˆ
lP +
(α
2
− 1
6
)
(2c+ s) +
1
2
(c+ s) +
∑
P∈Pˆ
eP
−∑
P∈Pˆ
sP
Here the second equality follows from the fact that A1 = ∅ and by Lemma 2.
The inequality follows by (13). Simplifying now gives∑
τ≥1
∑
j∈Aτ
vi,j −
∑
P∈Pˆ
sP ≤ 2αc+
(
α
2
− 1
6
)
(2c+ s) +
1
2
(c+ s)
= 2c ·
(
α+
1
2
α− 1
6
+
1
4
)
+ s ·
(
1
2
α− 1
6
+
1
2
)
= 2c ·
(
1
12
+
3
2
α
)
+ s ·
(
1
3
+
1
2
α
)
By Claim 3.1, at the start of the procedure the total value of items to agent i
in the sub-partition Pˆ is at least (2c + s) · 1. Thus upon termination, the total
value of unallocated items (modulo superfluity) is at least
2c+ s−
∑
τ≥1
∑
j∈Aτ
vi,j −
∑
P∈Pˆ
sP
 ≥ (2c+ s)− (2c · ( 1
12
+
3
2
α
)
+ s ·
(
1
3
+
1
2
α
))
= 2c ·
(
11
12
− 3
2
α
)
+ s ·
(
2
3
− 1
2
α
)
≥ (2c+ s) ·
(
11
12
− 3
2
α
)
Here the final inequality holds because 1112 − 32α ≤ 23 − 12α for α = 1130 ≥ 14 . Hence
the average remaining value in each part of Pˆ at the end of the procedure is at
least 1112 − 32α. This is at least α for α ≤ 1130 . Thus agent i must receive a bundle
of value at least α = 1130 = 0.3667. uunionsq
4 An Upper Bound
We now show that the analysis in Section 3 is tight to within an additive amount
of 0.007. Specifically, we present an example that shows the procedure cannot
guarantee a performance guarantee better than 40107 = 0.3738.
Theorem 4. The performance guarantee of the procedure is at most 40107 =
0.3738.
Proof. Set α′ = 40107 . We will construct an hereditary set system with the prop-
erty that the procedure will fail to allocate every agent a bundle if we select a
target value of α = α′ + ε, for any arbitrarily small constant ε > 0.
The set system contains six classes of items, denoted {A,B,C,D,E, F}. The
number of identical items in each class are shown in the second row of Table 1.
We assume the number n of agents is a multiple of 2 · 3 · 5 · 11 = 330. Moreover
these agents are identical. The value each agent has for a single item of each
class is shown in the third row of the table. Finally, the feasible (independent)
sets are defined by a capacity constraint for each class of items, as shown in third
row of Table 1. Specifically, a set S is feasible if it contains at most 2 items of
class A, at most 1 item of class B, at most 2 items of class C, at most 5 items
of class D, at most 11 items of class E, and at most 40 items of class F .
Class A B C D E F
Quantity n 1
3
n 2
3
n 2
3
n 1
3
n 40n
Value α′ = 40
107
13
4
α′ − 1 = 23
107
1− 9
4
α′ = 17
107
1
4
α′ = 10
107
2− 21
4
α′ = 4
107
1
40
α′ = 1
107
Capacity 2 1 2 5 11 40
Table 1. The Hereditary Set System
As feasibility is defined only by a capacity constraint on each item, it im-
mediately follows that this set system satisfies the hereditary property. (In fact,
this set system is a partition matroid which prompts an interesting open problem
that we discuss in the conclusion.)
We claim that there is a partition P = {P1, P2, . . . , Pn} where each part
has value exactly 1. Specifically, this maximin partition consists of parts of two
types. There are 23n parts of Type I: each part contains exactly one item from
all the classes A, C, D and forty items from class F . There are 13n parts of Type
II: each part contains exactly one item from all the classes A, B, E and forty
items from class F . Notice that in total we use n items of class A, 23n items from
classes C and D, 13n items from classes B and E, and 40n items from classes F .
Hence, this is a valid partition. Moreover, each of these parts is an independent
set as the capacity constraint for each class is clearly satisfied. These parts all
have value exactly one because
v(A,C,D, 40F ) =
40
107
+
17
107
+
10
107
+ 40 · 1
107
=
107
107
= 1
and
v(A,B,E, 40F ) =
40
107
+
23
107
+
4
107
+ 40 · 1
107
=
107
107
= 1.
Now let’s examine what the procedure does when faced with this instance.
It may allocate bundles as follows:
– Phase 2: 12n agents each receive 2 items of class A.
– Phase 3: 13n agents each receive 1 item of class B and 2 items of class C.
– Phase 5: 215n agents each receive 5 items of class D.
– Phase 11: 133n agents each receive 11 items of class E.
To verify that this is a valid output of the procedure, it is necessary to check
that all the bundles above were of minimum cardinality at the time they were
allocated. By construction, there are no items with value at least α. Therefore,
no bundles are allocated in Phase 1. Thus the bundles consisting of two items of
class A are indeed minimum cardinality feasible bundles when they are allocated
in Phase 2. After Phase 2, there are no items of class A remaining. Thus, because
of the capacity one constraint on items of class B, it is easy to see that every
feasible bundle of value at least α must contain at least three items. In particular,
taking one item from class B and one item of class C gives total value 40107 = α−ε.
Thus, in Phase 3 the bundles consisting of 1 item of class B and 2 items of class
C are of minimum cardinality at the time of allocation. After 13n such bundles
have been allocated then are now no items of classes B or C; hence only items
of the classes D,E and F remain. As the maximum value of any item in these
classes is 10107 , it is now not possible to obtain any feasible bundles of cardinality
4 with value at least α. Thus the bundles allocated in Phase 5 are indeed of
minimum cardinality; this exhausts the supply of items of class D. Now the
maximum value of a remaining item is only 4107 so there are no feasible bundles
of cardinality at most 10. Consequently, the bundles allocated in Phase 11 are
also all of minimum cardinality; these bundles also exhaust the supply of items
of class E.
Notice, at this point, we have allocated bundles to
(
1
2 +
1
3 +
2
15 +
1
33
) · n =
329
330 · n of the agents. Therefore, we must now verify why no further bundles are
allocated in Phase 12 and beyond. After Phase 11 all the items from classes
A,B,C,D and E have been allocated. Thus, only the items of class F are left.
But the capacity constraint on class F implies that no agent can obtain value
α using only items in F . Therefore the procedure terminates at this point with
1
330n of the agents receiving no bundle. uunionsq
5 A Polynomial Time Implementation
Procedure 1 is not a polynomial time algorithm. However, it can be modified
to give a polynomial time implementation given access to a valuation oracle for
each agent. To do this there are two main problems. First, the use of a phase τ
to search for bundles of cardinality τ is clearly exponential time if the procedure
ends up searching for bundles of large cardinality. Second, the procedure, requires
the maximin partition or, more specifically, the maximin share value for each
agent.
Here we detail how to overcome both these problems using a polynomial
amount of computation and a polynomial number of valuation queries. Specifi-
cally, we present an implementation of Procedure 1 that runs in time polynomial
in the number of items m. (We may assume the number of items m is at least
the number of agents, otherwise each maximin share value is 0.) Note that the
hereditary set system that is part of the input may be very large compared to
the number of items.5 Therefore, henceforth, we make the standard assumption
that the valuation functions are given via a valuation oracle. Specifically, for
each agent i, we possess an oracle which returns vi(S) when given a subset S
of the items as a query. Thus, our aim is to prove that the modified algorithm
makes only a polynomial number of calls to the valuation oracles and preforms
only a polynomial amount of additional computations.
5.1 Overview of the Polytime Algorithm.
Before diving into the formal proof, we discuss the intuition behind the algo-
rithmic modifications. Recall there are two main problems we must overcome.
First, if τ is large then searching over bundles of cardinality τ in Phase τ is
exponential time. This problem is quite easy to deal with. We implement Phases
1, 2 and 3 as before but then we group together Phases 4 through to m. We do
this by finding a minimal cardinality bundle S with value at least α for some
agent. That is, vi(S) ≥ α for some agent i, and v`(S \ {j}) < α for any agent
` and any item j ∈ S. We then allocate bundle S to a remaining agent who
values it the most. Finding such a minimal set can be done in polynomial time.
Moreover, this grouping of phases does not affect the performance guarantee as
the proof of Theorem 3 already implicitly groups together Phases {4, 5, . . . ,m}
in the analysis.
The second problem concerns the fact that the procedure uses the maximin
share value MMS(i) for each agent i. Specifically, this is used to scale the valuation
functions so that the total value of every part in the maximin share partition is
exactly one. Note that Procedure 1 does not require the maximin share partitions
of the agents. Moreover, the analysis in the proof of Theorem 3 requires only
that value of each part is at least one (or at least MMS(i) before scaling) rather
than exactly one. So if we could calculate the MMS(i) then we would be done.
Unfortunately, we cannot efficiently calculate MMS(i) so we must estimate it. For
5 Indeed, for m items, there are doubly exponentially many possible hereditary set
systems. For example, let Jm/2 be the set of bundles of cardinality exactly m/2.
Then any subset J of Jm/2 induces a distinct hereditary set system. There are
2(
m
m/2) such set systems and so we would need at least
(
m
m/2
)
bits to represent such
an hereditary set system.
additive valuation functions there is a PTAS for calculating the maximin share
value [16] but this does not extend to hereditary set systems; so an alternate
approach is required. The basic approach we take is as follows. Suppose we
had guesses µi for MMS(i) for each i and that all these guesses are known to be
overestimates. Then imagine running Procedure 1 with valuations v′i = vi/µi.
Next, suppose we get lucky and each agent is allocated a bundle. Now, because
the µi are overestimates, each agent i receives a bundle of value (with respect
to vi) of at least α · µi ≥ α · MMS(i).
But what do we do if some agent i is not allocated a bundle? In this case
we decrease µi to obtain new estimates and repeat the procedure again – in
fact, we can decrease µi for all agents who receive no bundle. We decrease µi
by multiplying it by a constant factor 1 − δ, for some very small constant δ.
After doing so µi does not underestimate MMS(i) by worse than a 1 − δ factor.
The key to the proof is then to show that the algorithm must allocate agent
i a bundle if we underestimate MMS(i). Hence the procedure will never further
decrease µi once it drops below MMS(i). It then remains to show that we only
need to repeat the procedure at most a polynomial number of times; this will
follow by obtaining suitable upper and lower bounds on each MMS(i).
5.2 A Formal Description of the Polytime Algorithm.
We now formalize the intuitive description give above and prove the resultant
procedure runs in time polynomial in the number of items m. Formally, our
polynomial time algorithm is described in Procedure 2.
Procedure 2 Fair Division Algorithm (Fast Implementation)
Input: A set I of agents, a set J of items, valuation functions vi for each i ∈ I, a
target value α, and a search ratio 1− δ.
for all i ∈ I do
Set µi ← m · vi(n), where vi(n) is the value of the nth most valuable item for
agent i.
loop
Call Procedure 3 on v′i = vi/µi to obtain an allocation A and collection U of
agents with no allocated bundle.
if U = ∅ then
return A and µ
Set µi ← (1− δ)µi, ∀i ∈ U
The algorithm calls a sub-procedure, Procedure 3, which groups together
Phases 4 to n. This grouping, in turn, relies upon Procedure 4 which given a
target value α, finds a minimal cardinality bundle of items of value at least α
and returns this bundle together with the agent who values it the most.
We then obtain the following theorem whose proof is the same as Theorem 3.
Procedure 3 Allocation from estimates
Input: A set I of agents, a set J of items, valuation functions v′i for each i ∈ I and
a target value α.
for ` = 1 to 3 do
while there exists a set S ⊆ J with |S| = ` and an i ∈ I with v′i(S) ≥ α do
Allocate bundle S to agent i
Set I ← I \ {i}
Set J ← J \ S
while there exists an agent i ∈ I with v′i(J) ≥ α do
Call MinimalSet(I, J, v′, α) to find a minimal set S of value at least α for some
agent k
Allocate bundle S to agent k
Set I ← I \ {k}
Set J ← J \ S
return The allocation made throughout this procedure.
Procedure 4 MinimalSet
Input: A set I of agents, a set J of items, valuation functions v′i for each i ∈ I and
a target value α.
S ← I
loop
j ← any agent maximizing vj(S)
if there is an element s of S such that vj(S \ {s}) ≥ α then
S ← S \ {s}.
else
return S and j.
Theorem 5. Let µ1, . . . , µn be positive constants. If we run Procedure 3, with
valuations v′i = vi/µi and target α =
11
30 , then every agent i with µi ≤ MMS(i) is
allocated a bundle Si of value vi(Si) ≥ α · µi. uunionsq
The contrapositive of Theorem 5 is that any agent who does not receive
a bundle has µi > MMS(i). Using this we may prove the main theorem of this
section.
Theorem 6. Procedure 2 produces an allocation where every agent i receives a
bundle of value at least (1− δ) · α · MMS(i).
Proof. We prove this by induction on the number of iterations of the loop in
Procedure 2. In fact, we prove the stronger statement that µi ≥ (1− δ) · MMS(i)
for every agent i throughout the procedure. Thus, in the last call to Procedure
3, each agent receives a bundle (as U = ∅) of value α ·µi ≥ (1−δ) ·α ·MMS(i). For
the base case, before the first iteration, we have vi(J) ≥ MMS(i) > (1− δ) · MMS(i)
for each agent i. Next suppose µi ≥ (1 − δ)MMS(i) holds in some iteration `; we
now show it still holds in the iteration `+ 1. There are two cases. First, if i 6∈ U
then µi is unchanged in this iteration and so µi ≥ (1 − δ) · α · MMS(i) is true in
the next iteration. Second, if i ∈ U then, by the contrapositive of Theorem 5,
we have that µi > MMS(i). Then since µi is multiplied by a factor (1− δ), in the
next iteration we have µi ≥ (1− δ) · MMS(i) as required. uunionsq
We remark that we can run Procedure 2 with n identical copies of an agent
to obtain a partition giving a (1 − δ) · 1130 approximation to the maximin share
value of that agent.
Theorem 7. There is a (1 − δ) · 1130 -approximation algorithm for the maximin
share problem on hereditary set families for any δ > 0. uunionsq
5.3 The Running Time.
Let’s verify that this algorithm needs at most a polynomial number of valuation
queries.
Procedure 4 requires at most m iterations as we remove at least one item
each iteration. In each iteration, it takes |S| ≤ m queries to find whether there
is an item removable from S and we may attempt to do this for all n agents.
Thus, Procedure 4 runs in polynomial time.
Procedure 3 first searches all bundles of size at most three using O(n ·m3)
queries (by asking each agent for their value of each bundle of size at most three)
and then runs at most n iterations of Procedure 4.
The initialization step of Procedure 2, for each of the m agents, n queries
and O(m) time is used to find the nth most valuable item. Each iteration of
Procedure 2 updates at most m entries of µ. It remains to upper bound the
number of iterations of Procedure 2 required. To compute this, we need upper
and lower bounds on MMS(i).
Claim. Let vi(n) be the value of the nth most valuable item for agent i. Then
m · vi(n) ≥ MMS(i) ≥ vi(n).
Proof. For the lower bound consider any partition P = {P1, P2, . . . , Pn} where
Pk contains the kth most valuable item for agent i, for any 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Then
clearly vi(Pk) ≥ vi(k) ≥ vi(n). Thus, MMS(i) ≥ vi(n).
Next consider the upper bound. Take the maximin partition P for agent i.
Then there is some part Pk that does not contain any of the n−1 most valuable
items for agent i. Since all the other items have value at most vi(n) we have that
vi(Pk) ≤ m · vi(n). Thus, MMS(i) ≤ m · vi(n). uunionsq
The ratio between these upper and lower bounds for MMS(i) in Claim 5.3 is m.
As our estimates for MMS(i) decrease in (1− δ) factors we have that the number
of iterations required is at most n · log1/(1−δ)m = O(n · lnm).
Putting everything together we see that the total number of demand queries
and the total computation time is polynomial in m.
6 Conclusion
We have presented a fair division algorithm for hereditary set systems which pro-
vides each agent with at least an 1130 fraction of its maximin share value. Several
open problems remain. The first is to close the 0.007 gap between the lower and
upper bounds given for the performance of the procedure given in this paper.
The second is to design a new procedure with a better performance guarantee.
Of course, this may be easier to do for sub-classes of hereditary set systems.
One very important sub-class is that of matroids. A matroid is a hereditary set
system that also satisfies the augmentation property: given two independent sets
S and T where |S| > |T |, there exists an element s ∈ S such that T ∪ {s} is
independent. Because the almost-tight example presented in Section 4 is a (par-
tition) matroid, the procedure presented in this paper does not have a better
performance guarantee for matroids. So a third open problem would be to de-
sign a fair division algorithm that exploits the augmentation property to produce
improved performance guarantees for matroids.6
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